Do you have a friend in me?

Aristotle turns his philosophy towards the subject of friendship in book VIII of Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle says friendship is “not only a necessary thing, but a noble one” and is capable of “hold[ing] cities together” (1155a).

But not all friendship is virtuous? Some friendships are of utility; “the person is loved not in so far as he is who he is, but in so far as he provides some good or pleasure” (1156a). These friendships dissolve quickly and change with what is useful.

Very incidental friendship at first

“Complete friendship is that of good people, those who are alike in their virtue; they each alike wish good things to each other in so far as they are good”, says Aristotle about the other form of friendship (1156b). This friendship is long-lasting in duration.

Aristotle claims that each friendship will last as long as beach party receives the same benefit – the complete friendship always gives both parties the same benefit. He then states, “it is bad people who will tend to be friends for pleasure or utility [. . .] but good people will be friends for each other’s sake, because they are friends in so far as they are good”.

I’m not sure when Aristotle last made a new friend (probably a while since he has been dead for centuries), but that’s not how friendships are made.

*I’ll pause while the proverbial glass of water is dropped and shattered by the awestruck observer*

How do we form a bond with someone? We enjoy their company. We find pleasure in their presence. As long as we enjoy their accompaniment, we consider them a friend. This relationship must last for months or years before we genuinely care about someone else for their own sake. Bob Brewton, chairman of the Baylor Angel Network, recently said, “once you get old, you don’t make anymore old friends. Your old friends come from the friends you make now”.

“Friends” helping each other out

My point (I know you’ve been waiting for it) is this – complete friendships comes from the maturing of an “incidental” friendship. To say one is better than the other ignores this. The effort put into creating a complete friendship, now that’s virtuous.

What type of friends are these?

Justice, meet justice

Many years ago, it was a different time, and I was in a different philosophy class. Sitting there, I noticed that many of classmates used the words “justice” and “morality” interchangeably. I casually joined the conversation and pointed out their oversight. The entire class, except one of my friends next to me, stared at me blank-faced.

“What do you mean they are different? Both are doing what’s right.”

I decided to illustrate with an example. Suppose that every college student needed to build their own desk to bring to class. The person next to me spent weeks crafting, and came to class everyday with a beautiful desk. I, on the other hand, was too lazy and wrote without a desk. One day, I really needed a desk to write on, so I asked the person next to me to break off a piece of his desk so I could have it.

A desk is also useful for table-flipping

Pop quiz! Would it be just or moral for my fellow classmate to share? It would be unjust, I argued, for him to share. There is no obligation for him to share, like the law, and I do not have any claim to his work. It would be unfair to him. However, sensing that I could benefit from his desk, sharing it may be a moral action.

Slowly the class began to realize the distinction I was making – while justice and morality are both doing what is “right”, how we define “right” changes between contexts. For justice, what is “right” is what is “fair, dutiful, or lawful”. For morality, what is “right” is….a question philosophers have argued over for centuries. Moving on…

Probably like this

I noticed that Aristotle seems to not accept this distinction. He defines justice as “the lawful and the fair” (Nicomachean Ethics 1129b). But he uses justice’s relation with the law to argue, “we call anything just that tends to produce or to preserve happiness and its constituents for the community of a city” (1129b).

Furthermore, he incorporates justice with his other we-will-call-moral virtues. According to Aristotle, “justice is the greatest of the virtues” (1129b). He breaks justice down into “what is proportionate” and what is “rectificatory” (1131b) – “distribution of common property” and “just in transactions” (1131b).

But now we get into the fun part. Aristotle isn’t clear (at least not clear to me) in his description of proportionate equality. He even recognizes that different political affiliations will disagree on the fair proportions. Which proportion is the correct one? It seems to me that the level of intertwining morality with justice is dependent on the level of fair proportion.

And then I realized, thinking back to my philosophy class, that maybe morality is the same as justice for some people. If we all have different fair proportions we see justice as adhering to, some levels may appear more of less moral.

Sorry buddy, blame Aristotle

Of Amiability and Humor

Chapter 6

In private relations with others – both in living together and in participating in discussions and actions – some people seem obsequious; in an attempt to please us, they praise everything and are never obstructive, thinking that they must not cause any pain to those they meet. At the opposite extreme, people who obstruct everything and think nothing of causing pain are called bad-tempered and belligerent.

Aristotle defines this “unnamed” virtue thus; it “seems most like friendship”, but “does not imply affection”. I would define it as amiability. Amiable people are polite, and are free with their compliments of others. However, they are not overly flattering to a fault.

The too “obsequious”

Being too “obsequious”, or too “bad-tempered and belligerent”, is not virtuous.

The “bad-tempered and belligerent”

My examples? Butters and Cartman from South Park. If you haven’t seen South Park, these clips may help.

Chapter 8

Since relaxation is a part of life, and one element of this is amusing diversion, here too it seems that there is a form of tasteful social conduct, namely, saying, and similarly listening to, the right thing in the right way.

Aristotle mentions another social virtue, that of humor. The mean is “those who joke in a tasteful way” who are “quick-witted”. Furthermore, “seemliness is proper to the mean state”. The virtuous humorist will know what is appropriate to say and laugh at.

The extreme includes the buffoon, one who “cannot resist a joke”, and the boor, one who “contributes nothing and takes objection to everything”. Once again…

The buffoon and the boor.

How to reach Nirvana?

“And I forget just why I taste. Oh yeah, I guess it makes me smile”

What is happiness? That’s my initial question after reading Books I and II of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. However, that’s not the appropriate question to ask. The best way to define Aristotle’s happiness is by looking at how we achieve happiness.

The aim “of all good things to be done”, “people call happiness” (5). So using the logic of Socrates in the Phaedo (in describing why Anaxagoras’ philosophy could be so valuable), we can look no further than what is and determine that it is in accords with our subject-matter (in this case, happiness).

But Plato gives us further direction. “Happiness in particular is believed to be complete without qualification, since we always choose it for itself and never for the sake of anything else”. (10-11). Furthermore, “the complete good is thought to be self-sufficient” (11).

So here’s what we know. The aim of people is happiness. Happiness is all we need. We do not require anyone else to be happy.

“I’m so happy, ’cause I found my friends; they’re in my head”

Great, what’s next? We achieve happiness by acting virtuously, apparently. “Virtue, then, is a state involving [1.] rational choice, [2.] consisting in a mean relative to us and [3.] determined by reason – the reason, that is, by reference to [4.] which the practically wise person would determine it”.

Well that answers my next question of what reason is. So how does this all fit? A reasonable person will determine how to act rationally , which in turns leads to virtue, which also leads to happiness. Borrowing the transitive property from intro to logic, reason will lead to happiness.

“I think I’m dumb, maybe just happy”

Understanding the drunken ramblings of an ex-lover

Alcibiades, oh poor Alcibiades. He drunkenly stumbles into a party and finds his love interest sitting on the couch with another man. In a strong display of emotion, he bemoans how Socrates never made any advances towards him but praises the man for all his wonderful qualities.

This is how I picture Alcibiades.

But surely Plato wanted us to extrapolate some meaning from Alcibiades drunken ramblings. Surely there is a rebuttal of Socrates’ definition of love somewhere! Which leads us all to ask…

As I read Alcibiades’ speech, I saw many of the effects of love. It leads to envy, admiration, shame, and some ridiculous behavior. It causes Alcibiades to be follow-up a critique of Socrates with compliments. He’s been blinded by his love, and all other manner of cliches. But how does this fit in with the progression of the Symposium?

First, it seems to reinforce Socrates’ definition. Love is neither good nor bad, beautiful nor ugly. Alcibiades clearly shows the ugly nature of love. This refutes the first speech by Phaedrus, that love is beautiful. It improves on Pausanias’ speech, who says that heavenly love (of which it appears Alcibiades is engaged in for Socrates) is not always “charming”. It brings Eryximachus’ 50,000 foot view speech down to a specific instance. It shows how love is not a pursuit of our other half, as Aristophanes claims, because clearly Alcibiades is not the other half for Socrates.

But I also noticed some comments by Alcibiades that show how love is not the pursuit of immortality. Socrates, his love, has “upset him so deeply that [his] very own soul started protesting [his] life” (Symposium 215E). Furthermore, Socrates “makes it seem that [Alcibiades’] life isn’t worth living” (216A). A few seconds later, Alcibiades exclaims, “I think I would be happier if he were dead!” (216C). And to coin the cliche of 50% of future Hallmark cards, “I can’t live with him, and I can’t live without him!” (216C).

While Socrates’ speech stresses endless life, Alcibiades makes many references to death and dying. This juxtaposition shows that maybe Socrates’ definition isn’t perfect. But unfortunately the Symposium ends shortly after this speech. I do not think Socrates’ definition is the paradigm of love, and Alcibiades shows us why.

 

Love is Like a Valley

Last week, we discussed how some philosophy develops like a mountain. It begins with a weak premise that is slowly developed and refined until an ideal conclusion is made. Plato engages in this rhetorical method frequently. His Socratic dialogues force the reader to critically examine a statement, evaluate it, and improve it.

But now we get to Plato’s Symposium, and I feel like I’m reading a valley instead of a mountain. Symposium begins with four speeches on love by Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, and Aristophanes.

Maybe the mountain is in the background.

Phaedrus briskly celebrates the goodness of love, exclaiming “Love is a great god, wonderful in many ways” (Symposium 178B). He believes, “nothing imparts this guidance as well as Love”, referring to “a sense of shame at acting shamefully, and a sense of pride in acting well” (178D).

I think this is a pretty agreeable statement. When we are around our loved ones, we try to stand taller, act wiser, and be better selves. We are also more ashamed when we disappoint someone we admire.

It also encourages us to use proper grammar – (use vs. used)

But from Phaedrus, the speeches go quickly downhill. Pausanias divides love into “Heavenly” and “Common” (180E) and argues “considered in itself, no action is either good or bad” (181 A). He believes that common love is “felt by the vulgar” and only concerned about “completing the sexual act” (181B). The virtuous love “is purely male” and “find[s] pleasure in what is by nature stronger and more intelligent” (181C).

Why do I disagree with Pausanias? I do not think the “vulgar love” is “love” at all. Someone interested purely in the sensual act, not afraid to deceive or abandon, is not guided by a sense of shame or pride, as expressed by Phaedrus. Pausanias simply separates love from lust, a distinction I believe to be inherent in Phaedrus’ speech.

Hah! Love gets a double word score!

Eryximachus’ impression of love is even worse. Taking the earlier ill-attributed lust and love, he expresses how “harmony” is created by “resolving the prior discord between high and low notes [. . .] harmony, after all, is consonance” (187A-187B). Love, the director of harmony, must be balanced between “common’ and “heavenly”. Eryximachus warns that, “we must be careful to enjoy [love’s] pleasures without slipping into debauchery” (187E).

This implies that lust is an extension of love that can be enjoyed in moderation so long as it is in harmony with righteous love. However, I believe the physical attraction within a loving relationship is different than that in a lustful relationship. For example, we are ashamed (or should be…) of physical actions done lustfully with someone other than one we love. Eryximachus furthers the misappropriation of lust to love and then tries to rationalize how lust can be good!

Yes Eryximachus, we heard you.

Aristophanes takes a completely different direction of defining love and weaves a cosmological tale of the “androgynous” human (189E) and our splitting apart by the Gods. Love, to Aristophanes, is a quest to find our other half (literally).

This pretty much “sums” it up…*ba dum tiss*

While we should consider Aristophanes’ theory with the same vigor as the other three’s, it does little to explain the value (or lack thereof) of a loving relationship, and I do not wish to evaluate the logistical flaws of his tale.

There is hope! Agathon and Socrates have yet to speak, so hopefully we are at the trough and beginning to scale back up the valley.

Mind, Matter, and Morals (3 of 3)

Part 3: Plato (Morals)

In the Phaedo, Plato retells a dialogue between Socrates and Cebes in which Socrates describes his disappointment from reading Anaxagoras. He heard that Anaxagoras said, “it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything” (Phaedo 97c) and Socrates supposed that Anaxagoras would conclude “the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best” (97c). Furthermore, “if then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be” (97c).

However, “as [Socrates] went on reading and saw that the man made no use of Mind, not gave it any responsibility for the management of things” (98c).

This is how I imagine Socrates looked after reading Anaxagoras

This question is a clear transition into the re-introduction of morality into philosophy. There exists some ideal that should be adhered to because it is the best. One could argue that this bestows an obligation on man to act morally. If morality is the “best” way we can conduct ourselves, our actions should be “directed” to be the best.

This could also be used as a justification for defining morality by how we already act. If our actions are “arranged in the way that is best”, we can use them to define what is best.

Socrates’ questions could also be used to argue that morality should be dictated by a higher power, a “dictating Mind” like God.

There is so much that could have been introduced! I hope to see subsequent readings include moral philosophy, but so far I am as disappointed with Socrates as he is with Anaxagoras.

You tell ’em batman.

Mind, Matter, and Morals (2 of 3)

Part 2: Leucippus & Democritus (Matter)

Ok, let me just get this out of the way first. The first fragment offered states “No thing happens at random but all things as a result of a reason and by necessity” (Curd 110). Way to start slow, Leucippus.

He goes for the knock-out in round one.

What a statement! But such a significant statement is completely glossed over for the remainder of the chapter, and no defense of this outrageously contentious claim is provided. Once again…philosophy! What are you going to do.

Back to the main thesis – the two philosophers argue that “the all [the universe] is both the empty [void] and the full” (111). What does that mean, you ask? “By ‘void’ people mean an interval in which there is no perceptible body” (116). But why is that important, you also ask? “It does not seem that there would be motion unless there were void, since what is full cannot admit anything else” (116).

According to the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, “Brahmagupta, around 650 AD, was the first to formalize arithmetic operations using zero”. If this is true, L&D conceptualized the concept of “nothing” approximately 1,000 years before the invention of “zero”.

We take for granted modern intellectual conceptualizations (like “nothingness”) but seeing such a significant metaphysical discovery is exciting! And “nothingness” still isn’t a universally accepted concept. Freshman year, I got into a heated argument with a computer engineer regarding the existence of “nothing”. He argued that it is impossible for something to be nothing, for it must be something.

In conclusion, I have nothing significant to add to L&D. But I am very impressed with their innovative philosophy, and I cannot overstate its significance.

Even more impressive than this zero.

Mind, Matter, and Morals (1 of 3)

Anaxagoras, Leucippus & Democritus, and Plato all separately inspired me to write a separate blog post, so I decided to split my responses into three parts. Philosophy…what can you do?

Part 1: Anaxagoras (Mind)

Anaxagoras has a strong metaphysical and cosmological orientation, like that of the many Greek philosophers before him. He argues that “all things were together, unlimited both in amount and in smallness” and “since these things are so, it is right to think that there are many different things present in everything [. . .] seeds of all things” (Curd 102).

Reminds me of pointillism.

Anaxagoras also says that “all things are in no way less or more [. . .] but all things are always equal” (curd 103). Furthermore, he argues that “all things will be in everything; nor is it possible that [anything] be separate, but all things have a share of everything. Since it is not possible that there is a least, it would not be possible that [anything] be separated” (103).

He continues to discuss the Mind (Nous), its “control over all things” (104), and how it “controlled the whole revolution” (104). However, my main concern is with his previously mentioned observations.

Wait for it!

I recognize that we are only reading fragments, and that Anaxagoras may have defended his statements better in full text, but I simply cannot accept his conclusions. Anaxagoras claims, “Nor of the small is there a smallest [. . .] but also of the large there is always a larger” (102). However, this seems to be logically impossible.

Suppose I say that two is greater than one. I can also say that three is greater than two. Four is greater than three, and this continues until we reach numbers not comprehensible through the human imagination. Eventually we reach the “number” infinity.  But any math person will tell you that infinity^2 is greater than infinity. At some point, we must say that infinity^infinity>infinity^(infinity-1).

It just never ends.

Even if we cannot imagine it, there must be something that is larger than everything else. For if there is something larger than it, that “something” is now the largest. Anaxagoras uses his proof to argue “in relation to itself each things is both large and small” (102). I believe this is a falsehood.

And according to the ordering of our fragments, “since [the proof that Cody just critiqued] are so, it is right to think that there are many different thing present in everything” (102). Since I do not accept his proof, I cannot accept his conclusion.

 

 

 

 

Excerpt from Small Group #2

I particularly enjoyed answering the fourth question for the small group paper, so I decided to post my answer here. 

IV.

Parmenides, Zeno, and Empedocles all addressed the same issue of being and “what-is” while coming to different conclusions. For simplicity’s sake in comparing the three, we will focus on one of Parmenides’ claims – everything that must be is what-is.

Zeno differed from Parmenides in methodology and in doing so violated Parmenides’ primary claim.  Initially it appeared that Zeno defended Parmenides well. He argued that “things that are are many, they must therefore be both like and unlike, but this is impossible” (66). so “things are not many” (67). When Zeno was questioned about his relationship to Parmenides, he stated that his work was “actually a defense of Parmenides’ argument” by showing that the opposite conclusion “suffers still more ridiculous consequences” (67). But by using negation and paradoxes, Zeno followed the Parmendian path of “the other” which is supposedly “entirely unable to be investigated: for neither can you know what is not (for it is not to be accomplished) nor can you declare it” (58). Furthermore, Zeno’s paradoxes showed that logic is in direct conflict with sensual experience. I disagree with Zeno that his conclusions were less absurd than those of the Parmenides ridiculers, but that does not have any bearing on the fact that Zeno was trying to align himself with Parmenides by utilizing methods condemned by him.

In this sense, Empedocles was the opposite of Zeno. He attempted to distance himself from Parmenides, but I believe he actually enhanced and continued Parmenides’ initial inquiry. With an allusion to Parmenides’ route of Persuasion, Empedocles stated, “It is not possible to reach and approach <the divine> with our eyes or grasp it with our hands, by which the most powerful highway of persuasion strikes the minds of men” (79). Somehow Empedocles ascertained divine knowledge, though, and he taught mankind “the four roots of all things” (81), fire, water, earth, and air, and expressed that “there is coming-to-be of not a single one of all mortal things, nor is there any end” (82). Even though Parmenides finally concluded that everything that is could only be one thing, both Parmenides and Empedocles wrestle with the question of coming-to-be and believe what-is does not come-to-be but always is. Furthermore, both recognize the duality of existence. Parmenides faced a dilemma when “before his gaze our empirical world divided into two separate spheres [. . .] the latter really express only the lack, the absence of the former positive” (PTAG 72). Empedocles also observed this dichotomy and explained it through “coming together into one by Love and at another each being borne apart by the hatred of Strife” (Cured 83).

Parmenides posited the questions – what is coming-to-be, what is, and how do we know? Zeno, attempting to agree with his mentor, inevitably goes counter to him. Empedocles, blinded by the grandeur of his own thought, took Parmenides’ views and expressed them through a different lens; in doing so he answered Parmenides and reaffirmed his original philosophy.