Do you have a friend in me?

Aristotle turns his philosophy towards the subject of friendship in book VIII of Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle says friendship is “not only a necessary thing, but a noble one” and is capable of “hold[ing] cities together” (1155a).

But not all friendship is virtuous? Some friendships are of utility; “the person is loved not in so far as he is who he is, but in so far as he provides some good or pleasure” (1156a). These friendships dissolve quickly and change with what is useful.

Very incidental friendship at first

“Complete friendship is that of good people, those who are alike in their virtue; they each alike wish good things to each other in so far as they are good”, says Aristotle about the other form of friendship (1156b). This friendship is long-lasting in duration.

Aristotle claims that each friendship will last as long as beach party receives the same benefit – the complete friendship always gives both parties the same benefit. He then states, “it is bad people who will tend to be friends for pleasure or utility [. . .] but good people will be friends for each other’s sake, because they are friends in so far as they are good”.

I’m not sure when Aristotle last made a new friend (probably a while since he has been dead for centuries), but that’s not how friendships are made.

*I’ll pause while the proverbial glass of water is dropped and shattered by the awestruck observer*

How do we form a bond with someone? We enjoy their company. We find pleasure in their presence. As long as we enjoy their accompaniment, we consider them a friend. This relationship must last for months or years before we genuinely care about someone else for their own sake. Bob Brewton, chairman of the Baylor Angel Network, recently said, “once you get old, you don’t make anymore old friends. Your old friends come from the friends you make now”.

“Friends” helping each other out

My point (I know you’ve been waiting for it) is this – complete friendships comes from the maturing of an “incidental” friendship. To say one is better than the other ignores this. The effort put into creating a complete friendship, now that’s virtuous.

What type of friends are these?

Of Amiability and Humor

Chapter 6

In private relations with others – both in living together and in participating in discussions and actions – some people seem obsequious; in an attempt to please us, they praise everything and are never obstructive, thinking that they must not cause any pain to those they meet. At the opposite extreme, people who obstruct everything and think nothing of causing pain are called bad-tempered and belligerent.

Aristotle defines this “unnamed” virtue thus; it “seems most like friendship”, but “does not imply affection”. I would define it as amiability. Amiable people are polite, and are free with their compliments of others. However, they are not overly flattering to a fault.

The too “obsequious”

Being too “obsequious”, or too “bad-tempered and belligerent”, is not virtuous.

The “bad-tempered and belligerent”

My examples? Butters and Cartman from South Park. If you haven’t seen South Park, these clips may help.

Chapter 8

Since relaxation is a part of life, and one element of this is amusing diversion, here too it seems that there is a form of tasteful social conduct, namely, saying, and similarly listening to, the right thing in the right way.

Aristotle mentions another social virtue, that of humor. The mean is “those who joke in a tasteful way” who are “quick-witted”. Furthermore, “seemliness is proper to the mean state”. The virtuous humorist will know what is appropriate to say and laugh at.

The extreme includes the buffoon, one who “cannot resist a joke”, and the boor, one who “contributes nothing and takes objection to everything”. Once again…

The buffoon and the boor.

How to reach Nirvana?

“And I forget just why I taste. Oh yeah, I guess it makes me smile”

What is happiness? That’s my initial question after reading Books I and II of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. However, that’s not the appropriate question to ask. The best way to define Aristotle’s happiness is by looking at how we achieve happiness.

The aim “of all good things to be done”, “people call happiness” (5). So using the logic of Socrates in the Phaedo (in describing why Anaxagoras’ philosophy could be so valuable), we can look no further than what is and determine that it is in accords with our subject-matter (in this case, happiness).

But Plato gives us further direction. “Happiness in particular is believed to be complete without qualification, since we always choose it for itself and never for the sake of anything else”. (10-11). Furthermore, “the complete good is thought to be self-sufficient” (11).

So here’s what we know. The aim of people is happiness. Happiness is all we need. We do not require anyone else to be happy.

“I’m so happy, ’cause I found my friends; they’re in my head”

Great, what’s next? We achieve happiness by acting virtuously, apparently. “Virtue, then, is a state involving [1.] rational choice, [2.] consisting in a mean relative to us and [3.] determined by reason – the reason, that is, by reference to [4.] which the practically wise person would determine it”.

Well that answers my next question of what reason is. So how does this all fit? A reasonable person will determine how to act rationally , which in turns leads to virtue, which also leads to happiness. Borrowing the transitive property from intro to logic, reason will lead to happiness.

“I think I’m dumb, maybe just happy”